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Abstract
The potential loss of privacy due to the use of location-
based applications may be one of the greatest obstacles to 
their wider acceptance. Nevertheless, most research about 
privacy management to-date has not taken into consideration 
the complexity in the utilization of collaborative applications 
that may require users’ location sharing among participants. 
In this article, we propose a privacy service that helps users 
to maintain their privacy policy in a flexible and incremental 
way. We also carried out a qualitative evaluation study whose 
results illustrate several challenges that should be handled in 
the design of such a service.
Keywords: privacy, design of a privacy service, LBS 
applications, context-aware application, context-aware 
middleware.
1. INTRODUCTION
The dissemination of portable computing devices 
equipped with GPS and the existence of several middle-
ware services that infer user location [31, 10, 16] have 
motivated the development of location-based applications 
(a.k.a. LBS – Location Based Services). These applications 
use the location information to offer customized services 
to the end users. For example, some of them allow users 
to share their location information with peers [38], make 
a search or send messages based on their location or prox-
imity, which facilitates coordination and orientation in 
groups [30, 13], such as in search-and-rescue scenarios.
In spite of offering some benefits, such LBS applica-
tions introduce also new risks and threats to the user’s pri-
vacy. These concerns call for location-based services and 
applications that consider privacy issues related to their 
usage from the beginning [36]. Nevertheless, the majority 
of related work [3, 5, 8, 9, 20, 33] does not take into ac-
count the high complexity of utilization of a LBS enabling 
privacy control. They do not take into account that the pri-
vacy level needs to be adjusted dynamically and that this 
control is highly dependent on both the situation, environ-
ment or task in which the user is currently engaged, as well 
as the levels of trust and the roles of the interacting users.
With the purpose of offering a privacy service with such 
a flexibility, we propose a service, called CoPS – Context 
Privacy Service, by which users can define and manage 
their privacy policy related to context information1 in a 
gradual and interactive way. This service has been inte-
grated into the MoCA architecture – Mobile Collaboration 
Architecture [42, 31], which allowed us to develop and ex-
periment with some privacy-sensitive and location-aware 
application prototypes. The main contribution of our work 
is that we propose a larger, more comprehensible and ef-
fective set of privacy control mechanisms that assist the 
user in building and maintaining her privacy policy.
From the discussions in Westin [46] and Altman 
[1] we learn that the concept of privacy, and the way of 
handling and controlling it vary substantially from indi-
1 We consider location information a speciﬁc instance of context in-
formation.
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them, simply does not work. Also, in his theory of privacy, 
Westin [46] states that “individuals, groups and institu-
tions claim the need of determining when, how and for 
which purpose information related to them are to be made 
available for other users”.
These concerns raise some questions about how pri-
vacy control is being handled nowadays. On one hand, do 
users in fact have the means of precisely controlling access 
to their information? On the other hand, how much us-
ers really care about their privacy? In the meantime, many 
companies put a lot of effort into collecting personal in-
formation from their client base. They use their consumer 
profiles, the history of their credit card usage, the web ac-
cess pattern, etc. in order to recommend new products, 
create focused marketing strategies, etc. which is a threat 
to the user’s privacy. This is further amplified if the dis-
closed information is the user’s location.
Some researchers [17, 4] have reported some results of 
polls where users said that they would not be concerned 
with disclosing their location information if they knew 
beforehand that the perceived advantages (of this disclo-
sure) are greater than the risks. However, we believe that 
these users would have a different opinion about privacy 
if they were exposed to a scenario where they could suffer 
some form of aggression, such as an hold-up or kidnap-
ping, because their location were disclosed. Therefore, 
user opinions are usually very dependent on the current 
perception of concrete risks and benefits which, of course, 
may change under different circumstances.
3. CONCEPTUAL MODEL AND PRIVACY
REQUIREMENTS
In this section, we present the conceptual model un-
derlying our privacy service, which primarily handles pri-
vacy issues related to access of user’s location information. 
The model applies also to other sorts of context informa-
tion, such as computational context, i.e., the state of the 
device’s resources, or quality of the wireless connectivity. 
We focused our attention on privacy issues related to loca-
tion information since this kind of information is the one 
that most stresses the privacy control issues. Therefore, in 
the remainder of the paper, we will use the terms context 
and location interchangeably.
In our model, each user is located at a well-defined 
symbolic place, which is represented by a name, and can 
change over time. The location information is inferred 
by a context service, i.e., a location/positioning service2,
that makes it available to the components of LBS applica-
tions. These applications, in turn, use this information to 
2 Recall that most LBS require some symbolic or semantic informa-
tion associated with a physical position, rather than just its geographic 
coordinates.
vidual to individual. Therefore, we believe that only the 
affected user is able to properly decide which of his con-
text information can, or cannot, be disclosed, because 
only himself is able to analyze, according to the situation, 
the risks vs. the  benefits of this disclosure. Hence, the main 
challenge of the design of a privacy service is not simply 
to implement the access control to the user’s information, 
but foremost to offer mechanisms that help the user to 
define and maintain his privacy policy in a gradual and 
flexible way. In this sense, the main question that guided 
our research was: How to provide a suitable set of privacy 
controls that offer flexibility and alleviate the complexity 
of the configuration and maintenance of the user’s privacy 
policy? In order to deal with this question, we have carried 
out in-depth research about the challenges and approaches 
to design a flexible privacy service.
In this paper, we make a general discussion about 
privacy (Section 2) and derive some basic requirements 
about privacy management related to location-based ap-
plications. We also present our systematic study of related 
work concerning the design and utilization of technolo-
gies used to mediate user interactions, with the purpose 
of defining a conceptual model and identifying some 
privacy requirements that may be used as a basis of the 
development of a privacy service (Section 3). Based on 
this model and privacy requirements, we have designed 
and implemented the proposed privacy service (Section 4 
and 5). Furthermore, we have carried out a performance 
evaluation to analyze the robustness of the proposed serv-
ice, as well as a qualitative study with users to identify how 
they would utilize some of the privacy controls provided 
by CoPS (Section 6). The obtained results allowed us to 
compare our approach with other related work (Section 7)
and derive some conclusions (Section 8) about the ben-
efits and risks related to the utilization of location-based 
application for collaboration and communication.
2. CONCEPTS AND DISCUSSION ABOUT PRIVACY
The notion of privacy is intrinsically associated with 
each person’s individual perception of possible threats 
to her property, or her physical or moral integrity. This 
implies that privacy is an abstract and subjective notion, 
which materializes into a wide range of different, concrete 
concerns, according to the individual’s specific demands 
in specific situations. Moreover, these demands are usu-
ally also related to cultural and social aspects of the user’s 
community.
According to [1, 2], privacy control should neither be 
static, nor strictly based on rules. He also points out that 
the current technology’s methodology for defining privacy 
preferences, e.g., users setting once some specific configu-
ration parameters and then having to live conditioned on 
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Initially, the PolicyMaker (e.g., the Subject) defines 
the privacy policy by using the Policy Management 
Interface (1). In parallel, and contiguously, the Context/
Location Service receives probed data from sensors and 
uses them to infer the Subject’s location (2). This infor-
mation, however, will be disclosed (to the Requester), de-
pending on the restrictions specified by the privacy policy. 
The authenticity of the Requester will be guaranteed by 
an Authentication Service (not depicted). When the re-
quest is received by the Context Service (3), it sends an 
authorization request to the Privacy Service. According to 
the privacy policy, the Privacy Service then replies with 
a “Grant’’, a “Deny’’ or a “Not Available’’ message (4). 
Based on this reply, the Context Service then delivers - or 
not - the requested information.
In this model, the user does not need to define her 
privacy policy before she begins to utilize the LBS applica-
tion, but can use some pre-defined privacy rules that are 
stored in the Context Privacy Service. Then, while she 
is using the LBS application, she can gradually define 
her own rules through a Privacy Policy Configuration 
Application and by such she will naturally create her own 
privacy policy, customized to her current need.
In the model, we assume that the Privacy Service can-
not be made responsible for the possible consequences 
that may arise if the Requester forwards the Subject’s con-
text information to other users. As discussed by Grudin 
[14], the risks of a privacy invasion are not only deter-
mined by the means of its access, but are dependent also 
on the way that the information is stored (where, for how 
long, etc.) and distributed.
Moreover, we are making the following assumptions 
in the model: a) the Requester, the Subject and the 
PolicyMaker have each an unique identity which cannot 
be forged; b) the Privacy Service is used within a commu-
nity where the users know each other and have a certain 
basic level of trust in each other, e.g., employees within a 
same organization, class-mates, friends, etc.
The use of the privacy service within such a commu-
nity benefits from the implicit relation of trust and the 
individual’s desire to maintain her reputation, which are 
essential elements of any social environment. It also helps 
to identify the possible types of requesters which need to 
be considered when devising the privacy policies [29].
It is worth mentioning, however, that the definition - 
and user’s perception - of a community is an individual 
notion, and hence may vary from person to person. 
Therefore, even within a well-defined - or informally per-
ceived - community, a user may feel the need to keep her 
privacy according to her personal preferences. For exam-
ple, the Subject may wish to deny or grant access to her 
location information depending on the identity of the 
Requester (e.g., her boss, a colleague, etc.), the circum-
provide specific, collaboration-enhancing, services to the 
‘located’ user or her peers, such as detection of user prox-
imity, location-specific media/data access, etc.
The proposed model comprises several entities whose 
roles are explained as follows:
x Requester is a properly authenticated user that
requests access to the context (i.e., location) of 
a Subject, which is produced and made available 
by a context service (or location service);
x Subject is the user whose context/location infor-
mation is been requested;
x PolicyMaker is the user that is responsible for cre-
ating or modifying the privacy policy. She may 
be the Subject or another user, i.e., the model 
allows policy management both by the owner of 
the information and by the systems administra-
tor of the organization (e.g., a company, or an 
institution)
x Context/Location Service is a computational en-
tity responsible for processing the context access 
requests by the Requesters, publicizing the con-
text information of the Subject, as long as the 
Privacy Service issues the corresponding author-
ization for the request.
x LBS Application is a distributed software system 
for communication or collaboration through 
which a Requester requests access to the Subject’s 
context information;
x Privacy Service is the computational entity 
through which the Subject controls the access 
and sharing of her context/location information, 
according to the rules of the privacy policy de-
fined by the PolicyMaker. 
Figure 1 depicts the typical pattern of interaction 
among the entities of the above described model.
Contex privacy service














Figure 1. Interaction among the Entities.
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is stronger than the specific user policies, for example, to 
ensure that each person’s location is always available for 
applications required in emergency situations, such as 
guidance to exits during fire-alarms, etc. The user-level 
policy is defined by the Subject, and should have prec-
edence over the default policy. The latter consists of a 
template of rules (also defined by the system administra-
tor), which are applied to each new user until she creates 
her own policy. For some users, which do not care to de-
fine their own privacy policy, this default policy may be 
good enough for their daily tasks within the organization. 
Results presented by other authors [35] indicate that, in 
fact, most users do not care to modify the default system 
configurations of LBS applications. Therefore, the exist-
ence of a default policy is very important, specially in the 
early phase of a LBS deployment, since the users are not 
impelled to immediately set up their own policy, just to 
have minimal privacy control.
The privacy service should also offer different types of 
access control policies, since there are always users who are 
either very much or very little concerned with privacy is-
sues, and who may want to adopt a more conservative, a 
more liberal or a moderate approach concerning the dis-
closure of their personal information. Our approach was 
to define three types of policies: Reserved (i.e., conserva-
tive), Liberal, and On-Demand. In Reserved type, by defini-
tion all the requests are denied, except the ones that match 
any rule which grants the access. In the Liberal policy type, 
all the requests are, by definition, granted except when the 
request matches a rule that explicitly denies the access. In 
type On-Demand, the final decision (Deny or Grant) for 
each request is determined interactively, by demanding an 
explicit input (e.g., Yes/No) from the Subject.
For each type of access control policy, the Policymaker 
can define a set of rules that determine under which cir-
cumstances the Subject’s context information will be dis-
closed, and he can choose any of the following outcomes: 
“Grant” or “Deny” (but not both), “Not Available” or “Ask 
Me”. In addition, the Policymaker (i.e., the Subject) may 
choose not to define any rule initially, and by such allow 
the Subject to use the On-Demand policy type, to gradu-
ally and interactively define her privacy control.
During the creation of a rule, the Policymaker 
should also be able to specify the form of notification
(e.g., e-mail, SMS) that is to be sent to the Subject each 
time that the Privacy Service receives a request. This 
functionality also establishes an implicit social protocol 
among the users, which may help to prevent some mali-
cious actions [23]. The simple fact that the Requesters 
are aware that the Subject may receive notifications of 
any access attempt can be a strong inhibitor of privacy 
violation actions.
stance (e.g., at lunch time, after work, etc.), with different 
precisions of the location information, etc. Several such 
needs for fine-tuned privacy control are taken into account 
in our proposed conceptual model.
3.1. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS OF A PRIVACY SERVICE
From the reults of a user survey [32] and results re-
ported by other research groups - and discussed in [40] 
- we found that the main goal should be to support easy 
customization and adaptation of the user’s privacy pref-
erences, i.e., the users should be able to gradually refine 
their privacy policies while they use the service, accord-
ing to their actual needs. In fact, this main requirement 
drove several design and implementation decisions of 
CoPS [40]. In the following we will discuss only the main 
requirements that we have identified. A more detailed de-
scription of the conceptual model and the whole set of 
requirements can be found in [40].
The main function of a privacy service is not just to 
implement basic access control for user’s context informa-
tion, but also to provide the user with appropriate means 
of managing her privacy policy gradually and interactively. 
In particular, it should help the user to easily define new 
rules, evaluate how they work in different situations, and 
allow her to modify and refine them, in order to properly 
maintain the desired level of privacy. This main require-
ment can be translated into the following properties of a 
Privacy Service, some of which have also been advocated 











In order to deal with the privacy needs of users with-
in an organization and individually, the Privacy Service 
should provide means of organizing the privacy policies 
in a hierarchical structure of several levels. However, based 
on our observations, we found that the following three 
levels are sufficient for most LBS applications: a level 
of organizational policy, a level of user policy, and the 
default policy level. The organizational policy is defined 
by the system administrator, and should have precedence 
over the other levels. Policies at this level are used by the 
organization to enforce some general privacy control that 
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4. COPS ARCHITECTURE
In this section, we briefly describe the architecture of 
the developed service for privacy control, (CoPS – Context 
Privacy Service), which addresses the privacy requirements 
presented in Section 3.1. The architecture of CoPS, illus-
trated in the Figure 2, offers a fine-grained access control, 
which enables the user to create and manage her privacy 
rules gradually, while using the LBS application.
In general lines, CoPS consists of a server and two cli-
ent APIs. The server manages the access to the context 
information and the APIs implement the protocols for in-
teraction with the CoPS server. The API Context Access 
Authorization (CAA) is used by the context (or location) 
service to send authorization requests (for access to the 
user’s context/location) to CoPS . The API User and Policy 
Management (UPM) is used by the application clients of 
the Subject and the Requester to access and analyze logs, 
verify the consistency of the privacy rules, among others.
The interaction between these elements, illustrated in 
Figure 3, is similar to the one described in Section 3. The 
main differences are the use of the APIs CAA and UPM
and the implementation of the user authentication as part 
of the privacy service. In the current implementation, the 
Requester authenticates himself at CoPS (3) to validate 
his/her identity. This authentication is performed through 
component DUMAC '\QDPLF 8VHU 0DQDJHPHQW DQG
Access Control), shown in Figure 2, which generates a 
VHVVLRQWRNHQWKDWLVXVHGWRFUHDWHD8VHU,GHQWLILFDWLRQ
7RNHQ8,7IRUIXWXUHUHTXHVWV7KH8,7LVDKDVKRIWKH
session token, and is carried on every request sent by the 
LBS application in order to certify that the user has al-
ready been authenticated. Both the request arguments and 
the token are relayed to CoPS by the context service in 
order to solicit access to a Subject’s location (5). The im-
plementation details of the generation and distribution of 
the user’s session tokens are explained elsewhere [41].
As a means of supporting flexible access control, 
the Privacy Service should also allow the Policymaker to 
adjust the temporal and spatial granularity, and the preci-
sion of the disclosed information. For example, consider 
a scenario where user John would like to share his loca-
tion information with his classmates, so that the group 
members can coordinate their activities using a LBS ap-
plication such as Friend Finder. But maybe John does not 
feel very comfortable of sharing his exact location. In this 
case, he could adjust the spatial granularity of his location 
information: instead of disclosing the information at the 
granularity of rooms (e.g., inside room RDC512), it would 
be disclosed at the granularity of buildings (e.g. inside the 
RDC building). John could also set the temporal granu-
larity (i.e., a temporal restriction), by specifying that his 
location information is to be disclosed only during a spe-
cific time period (e.g., Mondays to Fridays, nine-to-five), 
and only to a specific group of users. Moreover, he could 
specify also the precision (freshness) of the information to 
be disclosed, e.g., instead of his current position, the serv-
ice should disclose the location where he was 30  minutes 
ago.
According to Goffman [12], users assume different 
roles in their social interactions. This makes us believe 
that some users may wish to define their privacy control 
policy according to their current role, task or activity. 
Some of these modes, e.g., “relaxing”, “in a meeting”, 
are possible values of an activity context, which only the 
user himself can precisely define. Moreover, it is likely 
that the user might want to define a specific privacy 
control policy for each such role/context. In order to 
fulfill this requirement, the Privacy service should allow 
the Policymaker to create Privacy Profiles, where each 
profile defines the access control rules for a specific 
role or activity context. For example, when the Subject 
would manually select the profile “in a meeting”, this 
would enable only the rules of this profile, i.e., the pri-
vacy policy that the user wants for this specific situation 
or activity.
In order to increase flexibility, the Privacy Service 
should provide fine-grained access control where more 
specific rules have precedence over more generic rules. 
Hence, the service should implement a deterministic cri-
teria for identifying the most specific rule to be applied 
for a given request. Through this fine-grained access con-
trol, the user could, in each rule, specify a restriction or 
an action to be executed when evaluating a request from 
a specific group or individual. For example, for each rule, 
the user can specify a different form of notification, adjust 
the granularity of the information to be disclosed, restrict 

























Figure 2. General CoPS Architecture.
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x Policy Maker, Subject and Requester: as described in
Section 3. 
x Context Variable: The specific type of context data 
being requested from the Subject or its device (e.g., sym-
bolic location, IP Address, MAC-address, energy level, 
etc.).
x Application: List of application names that can be 
used by the Requester to access the context variable. The 
wildcard ‘*’ represents any application. 
x Precision: Specifies the value precision of the context 
variable (e.g., for the symbolic location information, this 
could be the spatial precision like state, city, ZIP code, 
building, room, etc.). 
x Temporal Restriction: Date and time interval restric-
tions for disclosing the context information (e.g., week-
days, from 9 AM to 6 PM). 
x Freshness: Specifies the freshness of the disclosed 
context information (e.g., location 15 minutes ago, or cur-
rent location). The default value is 0 minute. 
x Timestamp: Specifies the time in which the privacy 
rule has been created. This field is used to resolve possible 
conflicts among the rules. 
x AccessPolicy: Represents the type of access policy 
(e.g., Reserved, Liberal or On-Demand) that this privacy 
rule is associated with. 
x Policy Level: One of the three possible hierarchical 
levels of a rule: “organization”, “individual” or “default”. 
x Result: Outcome of applying this rule to a request. 
Possible values are: “Not Available”, “Ask Me”, “Grant” 
and “Deny”.
x Notify Me: The means by which the PolicyMaker 
wants to be notified when the rule is applied. The options 
available are “NoNotification”, “E-Mail”, “ICQ”, “MSN” 
or “SMS”.
4.2. GROUP DEFINITIONS
Group(s) definitions provide an additional facility for 
the management of privacy rules and also decrease the 
processing effort during evaluation of the requests. The 
Subject or Requester fields of a privacy rule can either hold
a userID or a groupID.
There are two general categories of groups: administra-
tor and user-defined groups. The first ones are structured
groups, which reflect the hierarchical structure of the or-
ganization, and define the corresponding user roles, simi-
lar to RBAC [43]. Groups at a higher hierarchical level 
LQFOXGH DOO JURXSV DW D ORZHU OHYHO HJ DW 8QLYHUVLW\ 38&
the group “puc.employee” comprises the groups “puc.em-
ployee.staff” and “puc.employee.prof’’, of which the latter 
in turn contains the group “puc.employee.prof.cs’’. The 
second category, User-defined groups, are arbitrary lists of 
userIDs without any structure, similar to buddy lists.
The component Communication Level, depicted in 
Figure 2, provides interfaces for synchronous and asyn-
chronous communication of either plaintext or encrypted 
data using the SSL (Secure Socket Layer). All requests that
reach the Communication Level are relayed to component
Controller which identifies the type of request and inter-
acts with the other components in order to execute the 
corresponding action.
The components Notification Dispatch and Interactive
Access Control are used by component Privacy Policy 
Specificity to send to the Subject, respectively, access noti-
fications and authorization inquiries, the latter asking for 
a Subject’s final decision regarding a request. This inquiry 
happens if the user has adopted an On-Demand access 
control policy, or when the action associated with a select-
ed rule is “Ask Me”. In response to this inquiry, the Subject 
shall reply with a Grant or Deny, and may configure CoPS 
to store this decision as part of his/her privacy policy, so 
as to avoid repeated inquiries in future requests.
The central components of the architecture, however, 
are Privacy Rules Management and Privacy Policy Specificity.
They are used for processing the requests regarding rule 
management and modifications in the configuration of 
the user’s privacy policies. Some of their main responsibil-
ities are: management of the hierarchical privacy policies, 
management of user groups, handling of temporary priva-
cy rules, perform the basic operations of rule management 
(e.g., inclusion, removal, etc.), among others.
4.1 STRUCTURE OF THE PRIVACY RULES
The structure of a CoPS privacy rule is composed of 
several fields. Any privacy rule is associated with a default 
access policy type (Liberal, Reserved or On-Demand) 
chosen beforehand by the PolicyMaker. The proposed rule 
fields and their semantics are described as follows:
Context privacy service


















Figure 3. Interaction among client and server.
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icy approach used (Liberal or Reserved). This field is very 
useful when the user wants to restrict the access in some 
special situations (e.g., at lunchtime or at working hours). 
The specificity for this field is evaluated in three phases: 
(1) select the rule(s) that match the time and date of the 
request; (2) identify the rule with the largest time interval 
and check whether the time interval of the other rules are its 
proper subsets (e.g. Temporal Restriction “Feb 5, 10:30 AM-
2:00 PM” is a proper subset of restriction “Feb 5, 10:00 AM-
6:00 PM”). Rules are considered to be at the same level of 
specificity either if they have identical time intervals, or if 
the time interval is not a proper subset of the largest time 
interval; (3) select the rule with the smallest time interval, 
when they are not at the same level of specificity.
With regard to the field Application, the specificity 
criterion uses only two possible levels: any application 
(represented by “*”) and a list of applications. Finally, if 
all previously considered fields are at the same level of 
specificity, the Result field is the one used to select the 
most specific rule to evaluate the request. The possible 
values for this field are: “Not Available”, “Ask Me” and 
“Grant” (or “Deny”). The “Not Available” result has 
precedence over “Ask Me”, which in turn has precedence 
over the others (i.e., result “Not Available” is more spe-
cific than “Ask Me”, which in turn is more specific than 
“Grant” and “Deny”). The reason is that “Not Available” 
implicitly means “Deny” and “don’t let Requester know 
it”, while “Ask Me” may be interpreted as “Deny” or 
“Grant”, depending on the Subject’s mood. A conflict is 
detected when there is more than one rule with a result 
“Not Available” or “Ask Me”, or when all rules have ei-
ther a “Grant” or “Deny” result. In this case, the last rule 
with highest specificity created by the PolicyMaker will be 
selected. It is necessary to define a deterministic choice 
for these situations because the conflicting rules may have 
different notification methods and only a single rule must 
be chosen to evaluate the request.
The privacy service was designed to be largely inde-
pendent of the set of relevant context types. So, it would 
be possible include new rules which mention new/differ-
ent parameters in all fields of a privacy rule, except for 
those that have explicit value restrictions such as “Result”, 
“Privacy Level”. The specificity algorithm implements the 
matching between the registered privacy rules and a re-
quest considering only the values of the Rule’s parameters 
and Request structure, independent of their semantics. 
4.4. PRIVACY POLICY EVALUATION EXAMPLE
In this section, we show an example of possible pri-
vacy rules for user Bob, assuming that the Reserved policy 
has been chosen as default, i.e., whenever a request does 
not match any rule, it will be denied. These rules (shown 
4.3. PRIVACY POLICY EVALUATION
During the evaluation process, more than one rule may 
match the request, for many reasons. For instance, when 
the requester belongs to several groups mentioned in field 
“Requester” of some rules (e.g., “Alice” belongs to groups 
“Coworker”and “MyFriend”), then all these rules match 
the request. CoPS’ specificity algorithm aims to determine 
the most specific privacy rule that applies to a request and, 
if necessary, resolve possible conflicts among the rules.
The specificity algorithm works as follows: Given a set 
of rules previously selected (by the engine) to evaluate a re-
quest, the algorithm identifies the most specific rule of the 
set by comparing their structure fields in the following order 
of priority: Subject, Requester, Context, Temporal Restriction,
Precision, Application and Result. When comparing rules with 
respect to a field, only the ones with the most specific value 
in this field are selected for the further specificity analysis, 
while all other rules are not considered for selection. This 
way, even if two or more rules have different relative specifi-
city (i.e., they differ in two or more fields) the algorithm can 
identify the most specific rule analyzing these fields accord-
ing to their priorities. For all fields, the wildcard symbol “*” 
may be used, with the meaning “least Specific”.
For the specificity of the Subject and Requester fields, 
privacy rules mentioning an individual user (e.g., “Alice”) 
are more specific than rules containing a user-defined 
group (e.g., “MyFriend”), which in turn is more specific 
than the ones mentioning an administrator-defined group. 
The administrator-defined group specificity follows the 
usual interpretation of a hierarchy: groups at a lower hier-
archy level are more specific than groups at a higher level 
(e.g., “puc.employee.prof.cs” is more specific than group 
“puc.employee.prof”).
The same hierarchy-induced specificity applied to the 
administrator-defined group is used also for the Precision
field. For example, when comparing rules concerning lo-
cation information, the most specific ones are those where 
field Precision mentions the lowest level in the location-
hierarchy, e.g., “country.state.city.zip” (level 4) is more 
specific than “country.state.city” (level 3). Two or more 
privacy rules can be at the highest level of specificity with 
regard to their Precision field if they have the most specific 
value, and are at the same level in the hierarchy. When this 
happens, the next field (according to the priority) of these 
rules is compared to identify the most specific rule. In or-
der to allow for such specificity analysis the developer of 
the Context Service has to define the syntax (e.g., campus.
building.floor.room) of the name hierarchy for this spe-
cific field, which is a configuration parameter of CoPS .
The field Temporal Restriction represents the time inter-
val and date at which the Requester is granted or denied ac-
cess to the context information, depending on the access pol-
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are the related rules. But among those, rules R3 and R4 
are selected because the user-defined groups mentioned 
in these rules are more specific than the administrator-
defined group of R2. Finally, the request will be evaluated 
by R4 because, despite their fields Requester, Temporal 
Restriction, Precision and Application having the same level 
of specificity, their Result value differs, and “Not Available” 
has precedence over “Granted”.
Scenario3: For Alice’s request to get Bob’s location 
rules R5, R6 and R7 should be examined. Among those, 
R6 and R7 take precedence over R5 because they apply 
to an individual user, “Alice”, rather than to a group, as 
specified by R5. Although the R6 and R7 are at the same 
level of specificity in the Temporal Restriction field, R7 is 
more specific than R6 in the Precision field, and therefore 
will be applied to grant the request.
5. ACCESS AUTHORIZATIONS CACHING
IMPLEMENTATION
CoPS has been implemented in Java and used 
MoCA’s communication API and Event service for 
the interaction between the CoPS server and the client 
APIs. We carefully structured and coded the Privacy 
Policy Engine so as to maximize the efficiency of the 
privacy rules evaluation.
In its usual mode of operation, the Context Service 
forwards the request to CoPS whenever it receives an ac-
cess request for the Subject’s context information. If the 
Requester is successfully authenticated and the request is 
granted, CoPS replies with a “Grant”, otherwise with a 
“Deny” or “Not Available” result. In order to reduce the 
response time of a context access request, we have imple-
mented a cache holding CoPS’ results of recent requests in 
in Table 1) determine how and when Bob’s location and 
energy context variables will be disclosed. In this example, 
we also assume the existence of some user- and administra-
tor-definedJURXSV%RE·VDQG38&·VJURXSVDUHVKRZQLQ
Table 2), which are mentioned in some of the rules.
Table 1. Example rules.
Rules Access 
policy




Precision Application Result Freshness Policy 
Level 
Notify Me
R1 Reserved Puc. Student Puc.
Manager
Location * puc Ap1 G 0 O e-mail
R2 Reserved Bob Puc.
Student
Energy 09:00 AM to 
06:00 PM
* * G 5 8 ICQ
R3 Reserved Bob My
Friend
Energy 09:30 AM to 
12:30 AM
* * G 0 8 ICQ
R4 Reserved Bob Coworker Energy 11:00 AM to 
02:00 PM
* * NA 0 8 No Notify
R5 Reserved Bob Coworker Location 09:00 AM to 
12:00 AM
* * G 0 8 No Notify




* G 0 8 MSN






* G 15 8 e-mail
Table 2$VVXPSWLRQVDERXW8VHU*URXSV
Assumptions
 Group  Members 
 user-defined  Bob.MyFriend  Bob, Alice, John 
 Bob.Coworker  Alice, Jane, John 
administrator-
defined 
 Puc.Student  Bob, Alice, Jane, John 
 Puc.Manager  Jane, Paul 
Through some scenarios, we will now explain how the 
privacy rules are selected and used to evaluate a request, 
using the algorithm explained in Section 4.3.
As already mentioned, the rule to be applied to the 
request is always the most specific one, and compari-
son of the rule’s specificity takes into account the fields 
Subject, Requester, Context, Temporal Restriction, Precision,
Application and Result, in this order. Thus, the algorithm 
compares the values in the corresponding columns (from 
left to right), and as soon as one (or several) rules have a 
more specific value in one of the columns, they are candi-
dates for further comparison.
Scenario1: If Jane makes a request for Bob’s location, 
both R1 and R5 would apply. However, the request would 
be granted by R1, because this rule belongs to a higher 
level than rule R5 and, consequently, the first rule over-
rides the others.
Scenario2: Consider a request from John to get the 
energy level of Bob’s device. In this case, R2, R3 and R4 
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ity and throughput. The goal was to measure how much the 
request processing by CoPS contributes to the total time 
spent for the context access request. In these tests, we used 
two machines, on which we executed the CoPS server and 
the clients, respectively. Both were 2.4 Mhz Pentium IV, 
512 MB of RAM, running WindowsXP Professional con-
nected to a fast-ethernet local network. In our experiments, 
we did not use CAA caching, and measured the response 
times of the rules’ evaluation process with and without 
network latency.
In essence, we wanted to evaluate three issues. First, 
we wanted to measure how the response time increases 
as a function of the number of applicable privacy rules at 
all specificity phases. Second, we wanted to identify how 
response time increases as a function of the number of 
concurrent clients with a pre-defined amount of privacy 
rules analyzed at all specificity phases. Third, we wanted 
to measure the latency of the specificity algorithm disre-
garding the network latency.
In our first experiment, we populated the CoPS’ rule 
database with a carefully selected set of privacy rules, in 
such a way that the same amount of privacy rules would be 
selected at each specificity phase. This experiment aimed 
to identify how the increase of the most-specific rule set 
(i.e., applicable privacy rules analyzed at each specificity 
phase, including temporal restriction, precision, applica-
tion and result) contributes to the latency. Figure 4 out-
lines the results of this experiment. In this test, we ran one 
client that made 100 consecutive requests and measured 
the average elapsed response time to evaluate the requests. 
We carefully set up the rules’ fields so that each different 
test could select a specific amount of most-specific rules 
to be analyzed at each specificity phase.
From this test, we have identified that the total number 
of rules in CoPS’ database do not have direct impact on the 
the CAA API. This way, once a request from a Requester 
R, related to a given Subject S, a specific context variable 
C, an application A and a precision P has been evaluated, 
the Context Service can evaluate subsequent queries con-
cerning (R,S,C,A,P) from the local cache.
From the results of our tests we could perceive that 
caching significantly reduces the number of queries to 
CoPS and also reduces the response time of the context 
access authorization.
The local cache managed by the CAA is completely 
transparent to the Context Service, and the developer of 
this service can decide whether he wants to use it, or not. 
When the CAA processes a new access authorization re-
quest from a context service that uses cache, it forwards 
the request to CoPS and subscribes itself at CoPS’ event 
server as interested in being notified whenever the result 
of the evaluated request changes. This way, whenever there 
is a change of a privacy rule, the event service will evaluate 
if this modification invalidates the result of any of the sub-
scriber’s request. The event server will only analyze the re-
quests that match the Subject of the updated privacy rule. If 
the result value changed, the server will immediately notify 
the subscriber(s), such that the corresponding CAA’s can 
update the cache with the new result of a given request.
After the Subject has defined his privacy policy the 
privacy rules will not be updated quite frequently, and con-
sequently, the number of notifications of cache updates 
will be low.
The main problem of using a cache for the access au-
thorization results is that there may be a short time interval 
between the update of a specific privacy rule at CoPS and 
the corresponding delivery of a cache update notification 
at the context service leading to a potential breach in the 
Subject’s privacy control. The context service developer 
has to analyze if the increase of performance out-weights 
an eventual risk of an incorrect result.
6. PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS AND USER
EXPERIMENTS
In order to evaluate the impact and the benefits of the 
proposed privacy service, we carried out two kinds of ex-
periments, a performance evaluation and qualitative user 
studies. The first experiment was done to evaluate how 
much CoPS adds to the response time of a location serv-
ice. The second one aimed at a qualitative assessment of 
how the test users would utilize the privacy controls of-
fered by CoPS .
6.1. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we describe some performance tests 


















No. of applicable privacy rules
Without Network Latency
Figure 4. Response Time vs. Number of Applicable Privacy Rules.
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current requesting clients, where each client made the 
same request 100 times. Next, we measured the response 
times with and without network latency.
The only difference between these two experiments is 
that the second one evaluates the specificity algorithm’s la-
tency, but it does not take into account the network latency.
The results (Figure 5) show a linear increase of both 
the response time including network delay and the algo-
rithm latency when the number of concurrent clients is 
increased. Furthermore, the results show that the specifi-
city algorithm’s latency has little influence on the total 
response times of a context access requests. These tests 
indicate that the overhead caused by the privacy control 
processing by CoPS represents only a small portion of the 
total round-trip-delay of context data access and process-
ing by a Context Service.
6.2 QUALITATIVE USER STUDIES
Because privacy is a subjective concept with a wide 
range of individual variations in interpretations and pref-
erences, we have carried out a study with typical users (in 
their particular social and cultural context). They were 
exposed to simulated situations where the level of loca-
tion information disclosure was an important issue, and 
asked to use CoPS’ privacy-control functions to adjust 
their privacy rules. The goal of the study was to gain a 
deeper understanding of the ways that the user configures 
and modifies her privacy settings, and not to generalize, 
or even predict, how most users would deal with privacy 
problems using CoPS .
The participants were interviewed and later played a 
game using a CoPS simulation. We used a simplified in-
door-location-based multi-player treasure hunt game LoMC
(Figure 6). The game provided instant messaging (chat) 
capability and means of querying the other participant’s 
locations, as well as controlling disclosure of the own lo-
cation. We then exposed the user to some hypothetic sce-
narios of a two-team treasury hunt competition (through 
a game instructions chat room), where she would have to 
interact and coordinate with their hypothetic team-mates 
their movements and the best location disclosure strategy 
to win the opponent team. Through a server interface 
(Figure 7) we monitored and logged all the user’s actions, 
such as requests to access the other user’s location, (simu-
lated) movement to another location, changes of her own 
privacy settings, etc.
An analysis of the interviews and test behavior allowed 
us to appreciate whether the participants’ perceptions con-
verged to, or diverged from, some design assumptions re-
lated to the usability of CoPS. Specifically, the focus of the 
study was to find out how participants interpreted CoPS 
privacy control mechanisms. We wanted to know if the 
response time latency, because the SQL queries used for 
retrieving the rules (depending on the Subject, Requester, 
context variable and access policy) already discard all the 
non-applicable privacy rules with low delay. In addition, 
the algorithm described in Section 4.3 shows that each 
phase of the specificity analysis may eliminate some rules 
for further analysis. Hence, it is important to note that 
the main bottleneck of the specificity evaluation algorithm 
is not the amount of applicable privacy rules selected 
through the SQL query, but the number of privacy rules 
processed at each specificity phase. As shown in Figure 4 
the response latency has linear increase with the number 
of most-specific privacy rules. From this experiment, we 
can see that when the most-specific set is large (about 
200 most-specific rules at all specificity phases for a single 
request) the response time is about 20ms. However, we 
believe this to be unlikely scenario, and that in practice 
in the worst-case, the specificity algorithm will select and 
evaluate, at each specificity phase, no more than 15 pri-
vacy rules for each request. Hence, we realized the follow-
ing tests (shown in Figure 5) using a pre-defined set of 
15 most-specific applicable rules.
Figure 5 shows the results of the second and third 
experiments, where we analyzed the average response 
time, varying the number of concurrent clients. For these 
tests, we populated CoPS’ user database with 301 users: 
300 possible Requesters and one Subject ‘S1’. In order 
to reduce the amount of privacy rules, we grouped the 
300 Requesters into ‘MyFriend’ group and created 15 pri-
vacy rules with the Subject and Requester fields holding 
‘S1’ and ‘MyFriend’ values respectively. All these rules 
ZHUHDWWKH,1',9,'8$/OHYHODQGZHDVVXPHGWKDWWKH
Liberal default access policy had been chosen. We also 
carefully set up the rules’ fields so that all of them would 
be always selected/analyzed in all specificity phases for 























No. of concurrent requests
With Network Latency
Without Network Latency
Figure 5. Response Time vs. No. of Concurrent Requests.
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Figure 6. LoMC Client.
Figure 7. LoMC Server.
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Hypothesis 3: Some users don’t care whether their lo-
cation is known by other users or not.
Hypothesis 4: Some users are willing to create different 
privacy profiles to match different social roles that they 
play (e.g., teacher, supervisor, project coordinator).
Hypothesis 5: There are certain social situations where 
users want to deny access to their location information, 
but they don’t want requesters to know they are doing it. 
In order to assess the plausibility of the above design 
hypotheses, we elaborated a series of plausible privacy-
sensitive social scenarios, and cast them in the context 
of a game. We also elaborated a set of open-ended ques-
tions that participants should answer before and after they 
played the simulated game. Such questions addressed as-
pects of the game scenario, both related to specific design 
hypotheses. Thus, we could triangulate conclusions about 
the value of CoPS designed features.
The procedures of the experiment started with the in-
terviews, whose questions were divided into two groups. 
The first group of questions aimed at finding out how re-
spondents dealt with privacy issued while using chat, in-
stant messaging, and cell phones. The second, aimed at 
finding what they rationally think they would do while us-
ing LBS to play a `quest’ game (competitors should find 
the location of various objects, based on cues they were 
given individually). Two examples of pre-test interview 
questions are: 
x 'R\RXKDYHSHUVRQDOSULYDF\FULWHULDWRDQVZHUDFHOO
phone call? What about for making a call yourself?
x 'R\RXVHHDSUREOHPLIDSOD\HUGHFLGHVWRGLVFORVH
his location to his group or to his opponents?
The next procedure was the game. First, participants 
were given a short tutorial where we explained the game 
itself and how to use the simulator. The quest game was 
played by two competing teams. Each player’s goal was 
to help his or her team find a number of hidden objects 
around campus before the other team did it. The quest 
was to take place in their habitual campus life context, 
i.e., some of their team members might be in class or in a 
meeting with their supervisors, while others might be free 
to look for the objects. All communication among team 
members was done via the simulator. The game simula-
WRUZRUNHG OLNHD WH[WEDVHG08'RU53*V\VWHPHJ
$GYHQWXUHV 8QOLPLWHG  KWWSZZZWKDUHOQHW DQG OR-
cation information was signified by the names of places 
around campus (like buildings, cafeterias, lounges, etc). 
The simulator was controlled by one of the authors, who 
was the game manager, capable of sending different sce-
nario parts to the players, inducing different situations and 
unfolding of the game strategy. For example, the simulator 
could send a player a text message shown in Figure 7: “The 
members of your group know that you are close to a lost 
users perceived them to be effective (i.e., “if they worked”) 
and useful (i.e., if they met their expectations) with respect 
to handling privacy issues in location-based services.
Qualitative studies usually require long preparation 
and laborious execution [45]. Our experiment required 
the preparation of the hypothetical game scenarios, the de-
velopment of the simulator of the game, and the selection 
of methods and techniques for the interviews and the sim-
ulation. We made audio recordings of the interviews and 
video recordings of the participants’ interaction with the 
simulator. During the interviews, participants were asked 
open-ended questions, whose answers were compared, 
during the analysis and interpretation phase, with their at-
titudes and decisions while running the game simulation.
In the experiment, only a subset of the controls pre-
sented in Section 3.1 was used (e.g., controls for location 
visibility and notifications). We have decided not to run the 
experiment with all CoPS controls for mainly two reasons: 
the complexity of simulating comprehensible and plausi-
ble scenarios for each and every control dimension; and 
the influence of interface design decisions on the users’ 
interpretation of privacy control features of the simulator. 
In other words, simulating the use of all controls would 
require the design and implementation of a very game-spe-
cific and intuitive user interface, whose implementation 
would not be cost-effective and justifiable for the purposes 
of our qualitative studies. The critical question in selecting 
a subset of controls was, however, to know whether they 
were sufficiently representative of the kinds of privacy-re-
lated issues that using CoPS is likely to entail. Our choice 
was informed by previous studies reported in the litera-
ture, and, as will be shown, the subset of controls in our 
experiments gave rise to a rich collection of findings.
6.2.1. METHODOLOGY
Our studies were designed to collect feedback from 
participants with respect to a number of CoPS design hy-
potheses, briefly described below (for a detailed descrip-
tion, see [40]). In particular, we were interested in finding 
out whether there were reasons for rejecting them.
'HVLJQ +\SRWKHVHV LQYROYLQJ 8VHUV· 1HHGV DQG
Preferences:
Hypothesis 1: There are situations when users want 
to balance privacy against sociability, disclosing their 
location information in different levels of detail, depend-
ing on such factors as the time of day and the potential 
requesters.
Hypothesis 2: Some users don’t want to go into the 
details of configuring privacy-protection controls when us-
ing LBS. However, they want to know what information is 
being broadcast about them, to whom, and how.
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automatically trigger such profiles and if exceptions were 
easy to handle. One participant said:
“I would like to create profiles to control privacy-sensitive 
information. If the user has to configure each and every pa-
rameter every time, he is likely to make mistakes and give 
access to his location when he does not mean to.”
This reinforces our fourth design hypothesis.
However, our experiments showed evidence that weak-
ens the fifth design hypothesis. When they found them-
selves in situations where we thought they would choose 
to ‘Deny Access’, they did not do it. In post-test interviews 
most users said that they did not remember this option or 
that they did not understand it. We think this may have 
happened for different reasons. One is that the interface 
design made this option more complicated to find than 
it should be. The other is that in the game scenario itself 
the cues for using this functionality were not properly mo-
tivated. Therefore, further studies must be carried out in 
order to assess our fifth design hypothesis.
We also found that our design hypotheses may be rein-
forced or weakened as different social circumstances arise. 
For example, if users think that there is no particular risk 
in letting others know where they are, they may just let 
their location be informed, taking an occasional look at 
access request reports and notification. This goes against 
our first design hypotheses, and reinforces the second and 
third. In perceived risk situations, however, users block 
access to all location information, and carefully control 
how/if they are seen by others. Here our first design hy-
pothesis is stronger than the second and third. Therefore, 
the attitude of users towards our design hypotheses is not 
one of definitive accept or reject. It is contingent to the 
social and psychological circumstances of the users.
If such contingencies were found in a small group of 
participants, we can expect a much more intricate and di-
verse set of contingencies to be found as we expand the 
group of observed users. Consequently, we believe we 
cannot make useful generalizations with respect to the us-
ers’ expectations and needs. What can be learned from 
our experiment, however, is that effective and agile com-
munication of design features and system functionality 
probably constitutes the prime challenge of this kind of 
technology.
Along these lines, we collected evidence that some-
times users ‘waste’ the design effort because they ‘forget’ 
that some feature can be used. Yet, at the same time, par-
ticipants expressed their belief that maybe the technology 
should have even ‘more [sophisticated] control features’. 
This observation echoes an early finding by [6] about the 
‘paradox of the active user’. The authors found that there 
are conflicting cognitive strategies at work when users in-
teract with computer technology. On the one hand, their 
social context offers high payoff for ‘getting things done’ 
gadget, but we cannot know for sure if your opponents 
know it or not.”
Through the simulator’s interface (Figures 6 and 7)
participants could control the broadcast conditions of 
his location information, as well as to request informa-
tion from all other participants (in his or her team, and in 
the other team). Commands issued through the interface 
were actually executed by the human game manager in a 
‘Wizard of Oz’ setting [27, 26].
The final experiment procedure was a post-test inter-
view, where we tried to elicit the participants’ experience 
with the simulator, trying to find out if they could use the 
simulator’s interface, if the controls were felt to be useful, 
what were the main difficulties, how difficult it would be 
to manage those privacy controls in real life situations, etc. 
Altogether, participants were involved in the study for ap-
proximately 90 minutes.
6.2.2. FINDINGS
In pre-test interviews participants reported that they 
do care about privacy online if personal data is involved 
or if others can ‘draw conclusions about them’, like infer-
ring that they are working, or just passing time, or with 
their friend, and so on. As one participant said: “I care that 
people may have access to my personal information, or that 
they can find out that I am online and what I’m doing.’’
Nevertheless, we found cases where participants who 
said they cared about their privacy did not even bother to 
block their competitors’ access to their location informa-
tion. Such access did allow competitors to draw relevant 
conclusions about what the participant’s whereabouts, and 
thus there was an apparent contradiction between what 
the participants said and what they did. Engagement may 
have played a factor. Perhaps the simulated game was not 
engaging enough for some participants, but in all recorded 
interaction shows that most participants did control other 
people’s access to their location information. This rein-
forced our first design hypothesis.
We also found that participants disclosed their exact 
location information for members of the same team, and 
imposed some kind of restriction to members of the com-
peting team. We took this to mean that in real life situa-
tions they have strategies for deciding the level of disclo-
sure they grant to different people in different contexts.
Participants declared that they believed it would be 
too difficult to update their privacy disclosure preferences 
in various contexts. There are too many controls involved 
and the diversity of privacy-sensitive situations is wide. 
Most participants felt that pre-configured profiles (e.g., 
‘In a Meeting’, ‘Taking a Break’, etc.) could be used to 
alleviate this complexity, especially if there was a way to 
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of these works do not discuss how their systems would be-
have when the required location information is not avail-
able.
Myles [33] proposed a component framework for pri-
vacy control which has been integrated to the location 
service LocServ (Location Service). Through Validator
components, LocServ evaluates if the user’s location re-
quested by a third party may be disclosed or not. The sys-
tem presumes that a trustworthy organization will define a 
set of Validators, in the attempt not to overwhelm the user 
with this task. For atypical situations in which the default 
privacy policy implemented by Validators is not appropri-
ate, the users may create new Validators by using tools that 
the authors considered “simple” and “intuitive”. CoPS has 
some similarities with this project. For example, both sup-
port time-related access restrictions, user groups and rule 
templates. However, in CoPS ‘s design we have considered 
a more practical and feasible approach for dealing with 
the challenge of the continuous maintenance of the users’ 
privacy policy, instead of just assuming that the system 
administrator is able to foresee the users’ privacy needs or 
that some “simple tools” will effectively help the user to 
manage her privacy policies.
The IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force) Geopriv 
[44] identified the need of processing and transferring the 
location information among location-based services and 
applications preserving the privacy of the involved users. 
Geopriv creates a location object that encapsulates the 
users’ location information and the requirements of pri-
vacy associated to the information. Some of the privacy 
requirements of CoPS are similar to the ones defined by 
IETF Geopriv, for example, the disclosure of the location 
information at different granularities and under temporal 
restrictions. However, because of the amplitude of the pro-
posal and the complexity of dealing with privacy issues 
in a general setting, Geopriv is silent about several issues 
related to the management and maintenance of the us-
ers’ privacy. As discussed by Harper [18], the rejection 
or adoption of a technology may be the consequence of 
an ideological attitude which, a priori, bears no direct re-
lation to the purposes of the technology. This makes us 
believe that general proposals tend to be unsuccessful be-
cause of the difficulty to take into consideration the very 
diverse ways that people in different communities react to 
intrusiveness by technologies.
Neisse et al. [34] have proposed the concept of a 
Context-Aware Management Domain as an abstraction that 
allows to enforce more generic, context-aware policies (of 
different types and purposes) on dynamic sets of entities, 
i.e., Requesters and Subjects, according to their associa-
tion with a common context situation, such as “persons 
nearby”, which holds for persons that are closer than a 
given distance. For example, such a context-aware privacy 
(productivity) and low payoff for ‘learning how to do things 
better’. On the other, users’ performance quickly reaches 
an asymptote at mediocre levels of efficiency, where us-
ers can ‘get things done’ (one way or another). Together, 
these facts suggest that users want technology to do smart 
things, but they don’t want to go into the trouble of hav-
ing to learn it. For designers and developers of computer 
technology, this attitude may be very disorienting. Carroll 
& Rosson suggest that:
“There are two ways we might reduce the motivational 
‘cost’ of learning: make the learning safer and more risk-
free, or make the relevant information easier to find. If 
trying out a new function is perceived as risk-free, a learner 
may be more willing to try it; it is less likely to interfere 
with the goal of producing something. Several design ap-
proaches have been taken in promoting the “safety” of sys-
tems during training. These fall into two classes - control-
ling the consequences of any given action by the user, and 
controlling the actions available to the user”[6].
Since ‘controlling the consequences of any given ac-
tion by the user’ when privacy is involved is not a realistic 
goal, we might try to control ‘the actions available to the 
user’. But, it is not clear if this kind of design direction 
would not cause more (instead of less) social blunders to 
users. Hence, further studies are clearly needed.
7. RELATED WORK
There are several research work that deal with privacy 
issues related to anonymity [21, 15], data confidentiality 
(through cryptography mechanisms) [20, 19], access con-
trol [11], privacy architecture to the Web [24], among oth-
ers. However, we cared to make a comparison with works 
that propose an approach, a service or an architecture to 
handle privacy issues related specifically to location- or 
context-aware applications.
Context Fabric (Confab) [22] is an architecture that 
offers privacy control mechanisms tailored to location in-
formation. The design of Confab’s architecture is based on 
several privacy requirements that stress flexibility in the 
use of privacy-aware applications. Compared to this work, 
we incorporated functionalities to CoPS that offer more 
flexibility for the user’s and organization’s privacy policy 
management. For example, we defined mechanisms for 
fine grained access control, user-defined privacy profiles, 
hierarchy of privacy policies, access control policies, ac-
cess reports, rule templates, privacy profiles, among oth-
ers.
8QOLNH &R36 &R%U$ Context Broker Architecture)
[7, 8] and pawS (Privacy Awareness System) [28] use the 
Requester’s location as a key information to determine 
which access restrictions should be applied for disclosure 
of each kind of context information. However, the authors 
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most users’ needs, the privacy service should feature a signif-
icant set of diverse privacy controls, giving the user a maxi-
mum of flexibility (to shape his individual privacy policy) 
and ease of managing it. In particular, these controls should 
support both conservative and liberal (aka. moderate) ap-
proaches toward privacy. For example, they should allow us-
ers to, a priori, deny all access to the own location, or enable 
users to disclose their location but monitor the accesses in 
parallel in order to identify and inhibit possible abuses.
As discussed in the results of the interviews and experi-
ments, the users should have much flexibility, but should not 
be overwhelmed with the configuration of their privacy prefer-
ences. This conclusion has pointed to us one of the main 
problems related to the design of a privacy service, which 
can be summarized by the dichotomy Flexibility versus
Complexity of privacy policy management. With CoPS the 
user does not need to define her privacy policy before she 
begins to utilize the LBS application, because she can use 
the Default policy rules. Then, while she is using the LBS 
application, she can gradually define her rules, by interact-
ing with the system (by choosing the On-Demand policy, 
or creating rules with an “Ask Me” result), and by such 
she will naturally create own her privacy policy, custom-
ized to her current need. Furthermore, the user can select 
the “Liberal” policy, where she is able to identify eventual 
abuses/intrusions through notifications and reports about 
access attempts, or adopt a conservative approach through 
the “Reserved” policy. The user may also create temporary 
rules, or set up privacy profiles, that will help her to change 
the current policy according to the circumstances.
It’s worthwhile to emphasize that, as discussed by 
[37, 39], there is neither a unique nor complete solution that 
ensures the users’ privacy. In order to achieve the privacy 
level closest to the desired one, we should take into account 
the combination of different resources such as the legislation 
with its well-defined penalties to the possible violations, the 
social and/or corporative norms, the possible technological 
solutions and, finally also the belief in the appropriate social 
conduct of users and companies, that should follow the so-
cial protocol and ethic guidelines established in the society.
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